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The Bush Administration's Forward Strategy for
Nonproliferation*
John R. Bolton**
It is good to be home among so many friends at the American Enterprise
Institute ("AEI"). I am particularly happy that Jeremy Rabkin and AEI have just
published The Case for Sovereigno: Why the World Should Welcome American
Independence.' I congratulate him on his far-reaching analysis, in which he
reinforces that security remains the core responsibility of sovereign states.
I thought it would be useful today to look at our nonproliferation policy in
this context, and the degree to which the Bush Administration has launched
initiatives that work cooperatively with other sovereign states to deny rogue
nations and terrorists access to the materials and know-how needed to develop
weapons of mass destruction ("WMD")-this rather than by relying on
cumbersome treaty-based bureaucracies to achieve these goals. Our policies
during the past several years have shown that a robust use of the sovereign
authorities that we, and our allies, have at our disposal can bring about real
results.
Methodically, piece by piece, the Administration is reinventing the
nonproliferation regime it inherited, crafting policies to fill gaping holes,
reinforcing earlier patchwork fixes, assembling allies, creating precedents, setting
new limits, and changing perceived realities and stilted legal thinking. And the
Administration is still building. To this President must go the credit for many
long-delayed but indispensable actions to reverse our slide into helpless gridlock
and inaction.

Address to the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC, June 24, 2004.
Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security.
Jeremy A. Rabkin, The Casefor Sovereignty: Why the World Should Welcome American Independence (AEI
2004).
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I. LEGAL ARCHITECTURE TO DEAL WITH NONPROLIFERATION

The legal authorities to deal with rogue states and actors, including
terrorists, intent on obtaining WMD, and their means of delivery are numerous
and varied.
A quick study of proliferation-related laws shows that there are more than
fifteen statutes dealing in large measure with these issues.2 We could have a
detailed debate about ways to revise or synchronize these laws, but in fact the
question really is not one of legal authority. Rather, the question is whether we
have the will to make full use of these authorities to take active measuresconsistent with our legal authorities-to address the problems of proliferation.
This Administration's central innovation, which I believe indispensable for any
successful nonproliferation effort, is the demonstrated will to use the existing
authorities to obtain our goal of disarming our enemies. This is a transforming
precedent.
II. "FORWARD"

POLICY ON PROLIFERATION

On February 11, 2004, at the National Defense University, President Bush
gave what is arguably one of the most "wonkish" speeches ever delivered by a
President. 3 I liked it. He detailed a number of proposals that made clear the
Administration's overarching approach: the frondines in our nonproliferation
strategy must extend beyond the well-known rogue states to the trade routes and
entities that are engaged in supplying the countries of greatest proliferation
concern. This is a "forward" policy, which can properly be described not as
"nonproliferation" but as "counter-proliferation." We are employing a number
of tools to thwart WMD and missile programs, including sanctions, interdiction,
and credible export controls. Most aspiring proliferators are still dependent on
outside suppliers and technology. Thus, we can slow down and even stop their
weapons development plans by disrupting their procurement efforts.
As we have learned clearly from such recent events as the unraveling of the
A.Q. Khan network and the Libyan WMD program, proliferators are employing
increasingly sophisticated and aggressive measures to obtain WMD or missile-

2

3

See, for example, the Arms Control and Nonproliferation Act of 1999, 22 USC 5 2551 et seq
(2000), and the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996, 50 USC § 2301 et
seq (2000).
For the text of the President's speech, see Remarks at the National Defense Universiy, 40 Weekly
Comp Pres Doc 216 (2004), available online at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2004/02/print/20040211-4.html> (visited Oct 5, 2004).
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related materials. 4 They rely heavily on the use of front companies and illicit
arms brokers in their quest for arms, equipment, sensitive technology, and dualuse goods for their WMD programs. These front companies and brokers are
expert at concealing the intended destination of an item and in making an illicit
export appear legitimate-in essence hiding the export in the open. Proliferators
take other measures to circumvent national export controls, such as falsifying
documentation, providing false end-user information, and finding the paths of
least resistance for trafficking in WMD materials. As the spotlight has shone
upon the Khan network, it is clear that those involved find the loophole in a law
or the weak border point and exploit it.
III. SANCTIONS
Economic penalties or sanctions are an essential tool in a comprehensive
nonproliferation strategy. Prior to September 11th, there was great debate as to
whether nonproliferation sanctions that were not "multilateral" should be
imposed at all. The imposition or even the mere threat of sanctions by sovereign
states can be a powerful lever for changing behavior, as few countries wish to be
labeled publicly as irresponsible. Sanctions not only increase the costs to
suppliers, but also encourage foreign governments to adopt more responsible
nonproliferation practices, and ensure that entities within those governments'
borders do not contribute to WMD programs.
This Administration imposed WMD-related sanctions twenty-six times last
year, thirty-four the year before that, and has already done so thirteen times this
year. That is an average of about thirty per year since we got rolling in 2002.
Compare that with the average number of nonproliferation sanctions passed per
year during the last Administration-eight-and you will see that this5
tool.
Administration is very serious about using sanctions as a nonproliferation
6
We have imposed measures under the Iran Nonproliferation Act, the Iran-Iraq
Act, 7 the Chemical and Biological Weapons Sanctions Law, 8 the Missile
9
Sanctions Law, and Executive Order 12938.10

5

See The Worldwide Threat 2004: Challenges in a Changing Global Context, Hearings before the Senate
Armed Services Committee, 108th Cong, 2d Sess (2004) (statement of Director of Central
Intelligence George J. Tenet), available online at <http://armed-services.senate.gov/
e_witnesslist.cfm?id=1084> (visited Nov 15, 2004).
Remarks at the NationalDefense University, 40 Weekly Comp Pres Doc at 216 (cited in note 3).

6

Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000, 50 USC § 1701 (2000).

7

Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992, 50 USC § 1701 (2000).

8

See Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991, 22 USC
5601 et seq (2000).
22 USC § 2797a (2000).

4

9
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Last month we imposed sanctions on thirteen foreign entities for WMD or
missile trade with Iran. These included sanctions against companies from Russia,
Belarus, China, Taiwan, North Korea, and Macedonia." As you can see by the
range of countries whose entities were involved in sanctions, we are not just
increasing the numbers but also looking for proliferation wherever it exists.
These sanctions under the Iran Nonproliferation Act illustrate our efforts
to utilize US statutory authorities to the fullest extent to advance our
nonproliferation goals. Under Bush Administration policy, the State Department
is reviewing every known transfer to Iran-not only of those items controlled
under US export regimes, but also of those items that have the potential to make
a material contribution to WMD or missiles.
Our perspective on sanctions is clear and simple. Companies around the
world have a choice: trade in WMD materials with proliferators, or have normal
trade with the United States, but not both. Where national controls fail and
when companies make the wrong choice, there will be consequences. US law is
clear, and we are committed to enforcing these laws to their fullest extent.

IV. NEW INTERNATIONAL MANDATE
In his September 2003 speech to the UN General Assembly, President
Bush proposed that the Security Council pass a resolution calling on member
states to criminalize WMD proliferation, enact export controls, and secure
sensitive materials within their own borders. 12 Over the course of eight months
the Administration worked to craft what became the unanimously adopted
Security Council Resolution 1540,13 which achieved all of the goals set out by
the President. We are now encouraging and assisting countries around the
world-in their sovereign capacities-to enact more stringent export control
laws, to put in place effective licensing procedures and practices, and to back
them up with effective enforcement mechanisms. Each of these parts must be
effective in order for an export control regime to be credible. For example,
tightening export control laws alone is meaningless without rigorous
enforcement. We frequently hear statements that countries are tightening their
export controls. But the proof is not what appears on paper, but in what

10

Pres Exec Ord 12938, 3 CFR (1994 Comp) at 950.

11 See Judith Miller, Bush Puts Penallieson NuclearSuppliers, NY Times A3 (Apr 2, 2004).
12 See Address by Mr. Geoqe W. Bush, Presidentof the United States ofAmerica, UN GAOR, 58th Sess, 7th
mtg at 8, 11, UN Doc A/58/PV.7 (2003). The text of the President's speech is also available
online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/print/ 20030923-4.html> (visited Oct
16, 2004).
13

Security Council Res No 1540, UN Doc No S/RES/1540 (2004).
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happens in reality, where trafficking in sensitive goods and technologies is
subject to scrutiny, prosecution, and penalty.
We continue active diplomatic efforts with like-minded states in the
multilateral export control regimes: the Nuclear Suppliers Group ("NSG"), the
Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group, and the Wassenaar
Arrangement. 14 None of these arrangements are treaty-based.
We exchange information about attempts by rogue states to acquire
controlled technologies and assess whether additional items should be added to
control lists. Since September 11th, these groups have each undertaken efforts
to address the risk of individuals or terrorist groups acquiring controlled
commodities for small-scale but lethal WMD projects. While the export control
regimes are an important tool in stemming proliferation from advanced nations,
trade between proliferators continues, often outside the control of countries
participating in these regimes.
We therefore are urging suppliers in each of the groups not simply to look
to the letter of their commitments, but to exercise maximum vigilance against
efforts by proliferators to procure items that would assist countries to become
self-sufficient in producing WMD and their means of delivery. For example, as
part of an effort to impede North Korea's procurement attempts, at the
December 2002 NSG meeting, lists were distributed identifying items that, while
not NSG-controlled, would nonetheless be useful in North Korea's reprocessing
or enrichment programs, and supplier states were asked to exercise vigilance in
preventing procurement of even these "uncontrolled" items. 1 5 We are also
working to tighten controls over nuclear-related exports to Iran and to raise
awareness of potential suppliers to Iran's aggressive clandestine procurement
efforts.
V. THE PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE
In 2002, the President released his National Strategy to Combat WMVD,
which contained the seeds of the Proliferation Security Initiative ("PSI"). 16 The
14

15

Additional information on these groups is available online. For the NSG, see <www.nsgonline.org> (visited Oct 16, 2004). For the Missile Technology Control Regime, see
<http://www.mtcr.info/english/> (visited Oct 16, 2004). For the Australia Group, see
<http://www.australiagroup.net/> (visited Oct 16, 2004). For the Wassenaar Arrangement, see
<http://www.wassenaar.org> (visited Oct 16, 2004).
See Nuclear Suppliers Group, Extraordinary Plenary Meeting, Press Statement (Dec 13, 2002),
<http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/PRESS/2002-Dec-Pressonline
at
available
Vienna.pdf> (visited Nov 15, 2004).

16

See Statement on the NationalStrategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, 38 Weekly Comp Pres
Doc 2150 (2002), available online at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/
20021211-8.html> (visited Oct 5, 2004).
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strategy emphasized enhancing the capabilities of our military, intelligence,
technical, and law enforcement assets to prevent the movement
S• 17 of WMD
materials and technology to hostile states and terrorist organizations.
Several weeks ago, in Krakow, Poland, sixty-two countries gathered to
mark PSI's one-year anniversary, which President Bush had announced there in
May 2003.18 PSI, a muscular enhancement of our ability collectively to halt
trafficking in WMD components, is among the most prominent of this
Administration's innovations. In developing PSI, our main goal has been a
simple one: to create the basis for practical cooperation among states to help
navigate this increasingly challenging arena. We often say, "PSI is an activity, not
an organization." This is not hard to understand, but it is unusual. We think it is
a fundamental reason for PSI's success to date. PSI is not diverted by disputes
about candidacies for Director General, agency budgets, agendas for meetings,
and the like. Instead, PSI is almost entirely operational, relying primarily on the
activities of intelligence, military, and law enforcement agencies. PSI reflects the
reality that, even as we continue to support and strengthen the existing
nonproliferation regimes, proliferators and those facilitating the procurement of
deadly capabilities are circumventing existing laws, treaties, and controls against
WMD proliferation. Through PSI, we create the basis for action to ensure that
we can stop proliferators in their tracks.
When PSI first emerged, it was criticized inaccurately as an initiative with a
shaky legal underpinning. In fact, PSI's foundation is our respective national
legal systems and relevant international authorities. There is ample authority to
support interdiction actions at sea, in the air, and on land. States around the
world have concurred with this fact and made political commitments to the
principles of the PSI. Importantly, the unanimous passage of UN Security
Council Resolution 1540 establishes clear international acknowledgement that
active cooperation, such as PSI, is both useful and necessary. Specifically,
paragraph 10 of the Resolution calls upon all states to "take cooperative action
to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, 19chemical or biological weapons, their
'
means of delivery, and related materials."
Despite PSI's infancy, there already have been notable successes. The
interception, in cooperation with the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy, of
the BBC China, a vessel loaded with nuclear components for Libya, helped

17

Id.

18

See Foreign Ministry of Poland, Chairman's Statement at the 1st Anniversary PSI Meetin Krakow,
Poland (une 2004), available online at <http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/other/33208.htm>
(visited Oct 5, 2004).
Security Council Res No 1540 at 10 (cited in note 13).

19
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convince Muammar Qadhafi that the days of his undisturbed accumulation of
the instruments of destruction were over.
This interdiction also helped unravel the A.Q. Khan nuclear, black market
network. Our citizens now understand the stunningly extensive nature of Khan's
trafficking in nuclear technology and materials. These revelations, combined
with invaluable information from Libya's program, have knocked the legs out
from under an especially insidious international black market in nuclear
weapons.
Overlooked, however, is the Administration's success in persuading
Pakistan's leaders to take active measures to interrupt the proliferation of nuclear
materials and assistance that has metastasized unchecked through the Khan
network for many years. We are now in the process of unraveling that network,
although much work remains to be done in Pakistan and elsewhere.
VI. THE GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP
Another important Administration initiative is the Global Partnership
Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, launched by
the G-8 at the Kananaskis Summit in June 2002 (the "Global Partnership").
Here again, the US-led initiative relies on the commitments of sovereign states
acting separately and in concert to secure sensitive materials. Like PSI, the
Global Partnership is an activity, not an organization. The G-8 pledged to raise
up to twenty billion dollars •over
. ten
.21 years for projects to prevent dangerous
weapons and materials from falling into the wrong hands.
The United States will contribute half of this total-ten billion dollarsthrough projects funded and implemented by the Departments of Defense,
Energy, and State, many of which were begun, and many of which continue,
under the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program. 2 2 Of the
remaining ten billion dollars to be committed by other G-8 countries,
approximately seven billion dollars has already been pledged. 23 Last year, the G8 welcomed the participation of six additional donor countries-Finland, the
20

21
22

23

See The G8 Global Partnershipagainst the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, in John J.
Kirton and Radoslava N. Stefanova, eds, The G8, the United Nations, and Conflict Prevention 289
(Ashgate 2004), available online at <http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/11514pf.htm> (visited
Oct 6, 2004).
Id at 289.
See The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Press Briefing on Nonproliferation (June 2004),
8
available online at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/2004060 -19.html>
(visited Oct 6, 2004); Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, 22 USC § 2551 et seq (2000).
See The Bush Administration and Nonproliferation:A New Strategy Emeges, Hearings before the House
Committee on International Relations, 108th Cong, 2d Sess 15, 31 (2004) (statement of Under
Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John R. Bolton).
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Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, and Switzerland-and this year an
additional seven-Australia, Belium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Ireland,
New Zealand, and South Korea.
The United States already has nonproliferation projects underway, not only
in Russia, but also in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Georgia, and other
former Soviet states. 2 5 Similar projects are also pursued by other Global
Partnership countries.
The United States has recently begun assistance in Iraq and Libya. We are
encouraging our partners to undertake their own projects in such states
worldwide, and at Sea Island, the G-8 areed to use the Global Partnership to
coordinate our activities in these areas. We have new legislative authority to
devote a portion of Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction
resources to countries outside the former Soviet Union, 27 and we are looking to
expand the scope of our efforts accordingly.
In the decades after World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union
built research reactors that used highly enriched uranium for fuel in dozens of
locations around the world. As a result, substantial amounts of such fuel are
stored at or near such reactors under security arrangements that vary widely in
quality. Both the United States and Russia want to convert such reactors to lowenriched uranium fuel and to remove highly enriched uranium. In recent
months, we have worked with Russia to remove highly enriched uranium fuel
from Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Libya, and we continue to plan for
additional removals. Our goal is to reduce to an absolute minimum international
commerce in weapons-usable uranium throughout the world.
VII. MORE TO BE DONE-THE G-8 SEA ISLAND SUMMIT
Even with all that has been done, much more remains-as the
Administration is the first to point out. The President laid out an agenda listing
several areas in which additional action is urgently needed, including addressing
the proliferation problems inherent in countries seeking to acquire the complete

24

The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, G-8 Action Plan on Nonproliferation 3 (June 2004),

25

available online at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040609-28.html>
(visited Nov 15, 2004).
See, for example, The White House, Fact Sheet: Administration Review of Nonproliferation and Threat

26

Reduction Assistance to the Russian Federation (Dec 27, 2001), available online at
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011227.html> (visited Oct 5, 2004).
See The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Accomplishments at the G8 Sunimit:

27

Day One, available online at <http://www.g8usa.gov/f_060904h.htm> (visited Oct 5, 2004).
See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub L No 108-136, 117 Stat 1662
(2003), codified at 22 USC § 5963 (2004).
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nuclear fuel cycle and the need for expanded export controls worldwide, among
others. At the G-8 Summit earlier this month at Sea Island, the G-8 endorsed
the President's agenda. In an Action Plan on Nonproliferation, the member
states agreed upon a number of steps, such as strengthening PSI and the Global
Partnership, and addressed and further elaborated upon each of the President's
proposals. In particular, the G-8 committed to work together to address the
28
threats posed by North Korea and by Iran.
VIII. THE USE OF FORCE
Now making the rounds is the view that the United States has lost
credibility around the world due to our policy in Iraq. I suggest the exact
opposite is true. In the WMD field, we, in fact, have gained enormous,
immensely valuable, and even decisive credibility from our actions there. We
have also learned that what we need to fear most in WMD proliferation are not
pieces of metal and stocks of supplies, but intellectual capital. It is the capability
and knowledge to create successful nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile
programs that is the hardest to cultivate but, once gained, the more real danger.
Coupled with money, like seeds and water, intellectual capital is what Saddam
was preserving for the WM\D-filled future he sought. Eliminating his regime, and
redirecting his WMD scientists and technicians, also eliminated that future. Our
actions have made a difference. This is not theory. We have proof in the real
world. Muammar Qadhafi's decision to surrender his weapons of mass
destruction programs came in direct consequence of our actions in Iraq, the
successful operation of PSI, and the broad political and economic pressures we
brought to bear over the preceding decade in favor of our counterterrorism and
counterproliferation objectives. It is a powerful precedent that a state can
surrender these weapons without a regime change. Our intervention in Iraq has
made this seminal message both possible and credible for the first time.
The benefits of our policy are evident in the current standoff with Iran.
The recent exposure of Iran's massive nuclear weapons program has startled
that regime into a hastily constructed policy of stalling and superficial
cooperation. The Iranians continue to state publicly that they will not give up
their nuclear programs, but their "cooperation" has been helpfully motivated by
their fear of US action against them. Here as well, Iran's adherence to the deal it
cut with Britain, France, and Germany for a suspension of its programs has been
made more likely by the readiness of the US to act-a source of real-world
leverage that even the Europeans privately acknowledge to be useful. In fact,
much of this has been accomplished not by threatening the use of force against

28
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Iran, but merely by calling for Iran's nuclear program to be placed on the agenda
of the United Nations Security Council. Never has the Council been so feared!
This is quite an achievement for an Administration frequently criticized as
"unilateralist."
Moreover, none of this has been lost on the North Korean regime. Our
demonstrated willingness to act decisively provides the decisionmakers in
Pyongyang with useful instruction in the rules and consequences of this new
world. Once again, this bracketing of the regime's options was made possible by
our actions in Iraq. The Six-Party talks are ongoing now, and we hope they will
yield progress. At the G-8 Summit, the leaders expressed their strong support
for the talks and urged North Korea to dismantle all of its nuclear weaponsrelated programs in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner as a
fundamental step to facilitate a comprehensive and peaceful solution.
IX. CONCLUSION
We must make up for decades of stillborn plans, of wishful thinking, and
of irresponsible passivity. We are already late, but we are no longer bystanders
wringing our hands and hoping that somehow we will find shelter from
gathering threats, no longer dispirited by difficult problems that have no
immediate answer, and no longer waiting for some international court to issue a
reluctant warrant or grudging permission to allow us to take measures to protect
ourselves.
This President has begun to lay the foundation for a comprehensive, rootand-branch approach to the mortal danger of the proliferating instruments of
our destruction. Let there be no doubt that this Administration is determined to
use every resource at our disposal to stem WMD proliferation. We use
diplomacy regularly, economic pressure when it will make a difference, active
law enforcement when appropriate, and military force when we must.
We are only at the beginning, but it is an extraordinary beginning.
Everyone in this room, everyone in this country, owes this Administration
thanks for the fact that we are not only meeting this ultimate of threats on the
field, but we are advancing on it battling not only aggressively, but
successfully. For the outcome of this battle may be nothing less than the chance
to survive.
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